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UNSCREWING THE INSCRUTABLE: THE UK 
BRIBERY ACT 2010 
Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin* 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 17, 1997 the United Kingdom, a founding member of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), 
signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (the "OECD Convention" 
or "Convention"). 1 This Convention obligates signatory states to 
criminalize bribery of foreign public officials by those seeking to obtain or 
retain business. The UK Bribery Act 2010 (the "Bribery Act" or the 
"Act")/ enacted after more than a decade of debate, delay, and desultory 
deliberation, is the culmination of the United Kingdom's extraordinarily 
extended effort to update its antiquated corruption legislation and thus 
comply with its obligations under the OECD Convention. 
The Bribery Act is a wholesale revision of all United Kingdom 
domestic bribery and corruption statutes, some dating from the nineteenth 
century. The Act applies to both domestic and foreign bribery. In this article 
we review the operative provisions of the Bribery Act and then focus on a 
shocking new crime: the failure of a commercial enterprise to prevent a 
bribe. This crime, which requires no criminal intent and no knowledge of 
the offending bribe, will ensnare many non-UK businesses involved in 
cross border transactions. This is so because the Bribery Act contains an 
expansive concept of what may be deemed a bribe under the Act and 
because the jurisdictional reach of the Act is unparalleled. The Act also 
provides that the offending bribe need not be committed by an employee of 
·- the·company; Any-''associated-person1' may trigger the·strict liability crime 
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1. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
2. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, (U.K.) [hereinafter Bribery Act] 
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of "failing to prevent bribery." The sole defense companies have to this 
crime is the nigh impossible task defense of demonstrating that the 
company had "adequate procedures" in place to prevent such bribery. 
Moreover, since the Act characterizes small facilitation payments, currently 
made all over the world in the ordinary course of traveling or conducting 
business, as "bribes", business as now conducted may have already 
triggered the Bribery Act's strict liability crime of failing to prevent 
bribery. Furthermore, this will be the case even for a non-UK business if it 
is found to be "carry[ing] on a business, or part of a business, in any part of 
the United Kingdom[.]"3 The surprising hypocrisy of Parliament 
criminalizing facilitation payments and, in certain instances, hospitality 
expenditures, while acknowledging that these are daily occurrences by both 
UK and non-UK companies, seems inexplicable. It is certainly indefensible. 
Part I outlines the United Kingdom's leisurely pace of bringing its 
laws into compliance with the OECD Convention - a process that began on 
December 17, 1997 and was completed more than thirteen years later on 
July 1, 2011, when the Bribery Act finally became effective. Part II 
analyzes three offenses created by the Bribery Act - bribing another 
person,4 requesting or agreeing to receive a bribe,5 and bribery of a foreign 
public official.6 Part III explores what in our view is the most egregious 
aspect of the Bribery Act, the strict liability corporate crime of failing to 
prevent bribery/ a crime that requires no mens rea and triggers unlimited 
fines. Parts I to III of this article draw on language from our previous 
article, Expansive Reach - Useless Guidance: An Introduction to the UK 
Bribery Act 2010.8 
Part IV probes the expansive scope of what is deemed a "bribe" under 
the Bribery Act. Once a bribe is alleged, a non-UK business doing only a 
part of its business in the United Kingdom will be guilty of failing to 
prevent a bribe even when such bribe was paid by a non-employee or other 
person over whom the now automatically guilty company has no 
operational control. In such a case, the sole defense available to the 
presumptively guilty company is to satisfy the burden of proving that, 
despite the occurrence of the alleged bribe that it failed to prevent, that 
company had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent that very 
bribe! We intend to show that the Bribery Act's operative provisions, 
particularly the strict liability provisions and the treatment of facilitation 
3. /d.§ 7(5). 
4. !d. § l. 
5. !d.§ 2. 
6. /d.§ 6(1)-{4). 
7. /d.§ 7. 
8. Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Expansive Reach - Useless Guidance: 
An Introduction to the UK Bribery Act 2010, 18 lLSA J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 325 (2012) 
[hereinafter Expansive Reach]. 
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and hospitality payments, are unprecedented in their jurisdictional reach and 
cannot realistically be enforced. We conclude by commenting on concerns 
relating to the Bribery Act's violations of due process and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Bribery Act cannot hope to effect, in a 
legitimate way, Parliament's goal of ending bribery in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere. 
I. WITH ALL DELIBERATE DELAY: THE SORDID SAGA OF THE ULTIMATE 
BIRTH OF THE UK BRIBERY ACT 
This part outlines the genesis and development of global anti-bribery 
legislation, beginning with the history of the United States Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, the predecessor of all modem anti-bribery efforts. We then 
explore the background of the OECD Convention and the role it played in 
the development and enactment of the Bribery Act. We also trace the long 
and tortuous history of the United Kingdom's efforts to comply with the 
OECD Convention by finally enacting the Bribery Act after more than a 
decade of debate and delay by Parliament. 
A. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The United States began the global campaign to eliminate bribery and 
corruption in international business transactions in 1977 with the enactment 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA").9 The FCPA, a curious 
artifact of the Watergate Scandal, 10 has two operative provisions. The first 
is that businesses keep accurate books and records of their financial 
transactions. This provision is enforced by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 11 For this article, the more important FCP A provision is the 
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as 
amended by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, sees. 5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 
78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff(l994)). 
10. The Watergate investigation revealed corporate "slush funds" as the source of 
contributions to the committee to reelect President Nixon, as well as to make "questionable 
payments" overseas. This led to an investigation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, which ultimately led to enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A 
description of the genesis of the FCP A is found in an article by Stanley Sporkin, Head of 
Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time the FCPA was being 
drafted in the mid-1970's. See, Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning ofSchmiergeld: A 
Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & 
Bus. 269, 271 (1998). 
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminaVfraudlfcpa/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). CRIMINAL DIVISION 
OF THE U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE U.S. SEC, FCPA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4- 5 (Nov. 14, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminaVfraudlfcpa/guide.pdf (hereinafter RESOURCE 
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prohibition against bribing foreign government officials to obtain or retain 
business. 12 This portion of the FCP A is enforced by the Department of 
Justice. 13 
It is important to note that the FCP A was amended in 1988 to make 
explicit that the FCPA does not prohibit "grease" or "facilitation" 
payments. Such payments are excluded from the definition of bribe when 
they are not "corrupt," that is, when such payment is not intended to obtain 
or retain business but simply to secure a "routine governmental action," 
such as approvals, licenses, permits, and the like, that are not subject to a 
foreign government official's discretion. 14 The 1988 amendments also 
included a direction from Congress to the Executive Branch to end the 
competitive disadvantage US companies believed that they faced when no 
other nation criminalized bribes to foreign officials by urging other nations 
to similarly outlaw overseas bribery. 15 This latter requirement ultimately 
resulted in negotiation and approval of the OECD Convention. 
B. The OECD and Other Anti-Bribery Conventions 
In 1997, twenty years after the FCPA went into effect, OECD 
member nations completed preparation of the OECD Convention. The 
OECD Convention obligates parties to enact domestic legislation 
criminalizing bribery of foreign government officials. 16 Subsequent to 
negotiation of the Convention, five other anti-bribery conventions have 
GUIDE TO THE FCPA). The Bribery Act does not contain a requirement that a company 
maintain accurate books and records. Such a provision is contained in Part 15 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006, Section 386. 
12. RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FCP A, supra note 11, at 4 - 5. 
13. !d. at 5. 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b)-3(b) (1998); S. REP. No. 100-85, at 53 (1987); H.R. REP. No. 
100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987). 
A "routine governmental action" is only ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign 
official in obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do 
business in a foreign country; processing governmental papers; providing police protection, 
mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or 
inspections related to transit of goods across country; or providing phone service, power and 
water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities 
from deterioration. The term does not include any decision by a foreign official whether or 
on what terms to award new business to or to continue business with a particular firm. 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-l(t)(3). 
15. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign bribery and American 
Business after 1977 (Nat'! Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995). 
16. OECD Convention, supra note 1, at art.l § 1. "Each Party shall take such measures 
as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person 
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third 
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the 
conduct of international business." 
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been negotiated, four of which are now in effect. The five are as follows: 
• United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 
31, 2003.17 
• Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999.18 
• Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention, Jan. 27, 
1999.19 
o Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, May 15, 
2003?0 
• Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996;21 and 
• African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003 ?2 
67 
The broadest in scope of these international expressions of disapproval of 
bribery and corruption is the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, which binds 140 states and has twenty additional nations 
currently dealing with ratification?3 
C. The Adequacy of Prior UK Corruption Legislation 
The United Kingdom is an original member of the OECD and was an 
initial signatory of the OECD Convention in December 1997. As noted, the 
Convention requires parties to enact domestic legislation to make it a crime 
to pay bribes overseas in pursuit of business. After signing the OECD 
Convention, the British government took the position that its existing 
domestic anti-bribery legisla~ion satisfied this requirement. This existing 
17. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, GA Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003}, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. 
18. Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. no. 
174, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm. 
19. Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. 
no. 173, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htrn 
20. Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, May 15, 2003, E.T.S. No. 173, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ 
Treaties/Html/191.htm. 
21. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 
Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-
58.html. 
22. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 
43 I.L.M. 5, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/treaties.htrn. 
23 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption: UNCAC Signature and Ratification 
Status as of 09 November 2012, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
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legislation included: the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889,24 the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906/5 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 
191626 (collectively, the "Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916").27 
Notwithstanding this official position, at the time of signing the OECD 
Convention others disagreed, observing that the Prevention of Corruption 
Acts 1889-1916 did not adequately address overseas bribery, since there 
had never been such a prosecution by the United Kingdom. 28 Indeed, until 
1988, bribes paid overseas were tax deductible in the United Kingdom.29 
One official entity with special expertise in this area, the UK Law 
Commission, an independent body that periodically reviews the laws of 
England and Wales,30 flatly contradicted the government position by 
declaring immediately after the OECD Convention had been signed: 
"Under the present law, the English courts do not have jurisdiction to try a 
criminal offence unless the last act or event necessary for its completion 
occurs within the jurisdiction." 31 Very clearly, however, the Bribery Act 
criminalizes acts of companies, even non-UK registered companies, which 
take place entirely outside the United Kingdom. 
The OECD has established a Working Group to periodically monitor 
compliance with the mandates of the OECD Convention by nations that 
have signed the Convention. 32 Each time the Working Group addressed UK 
compliance, it found it to be lacking. In 2008 the Working Group formally 
reported: 
Overall, the Group is disappointed and seriously concerned 
with the unsatisfactory implementation of the Convention 
by the UK. The Working Group is particularly concerned 
that the UK's continued failure to address deficiencies in its 
24. Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act,1889, 52 & 53 Viet., c. 69 (U.K.). 
25. Prevention of Corruption Act,1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 34 (U.K.). 
26. Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 64 (U.K.). 
27. Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 ("the 1889 Act") is concerned only with 
corruption in public bodies, while the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 ("the 1906 Act") 
extends the law of corruption to all agents. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 ("the 
1916 Act") applies only to persons "in the employment of [Her] Majesty or any Government 
Department or a public body." THE LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: 
CORRUPTION (LC248) 13- 15 (Mar. 3, 1998) (hereinafter LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: 
CORRUPTION) . 
28. /d. at 24. 
29. Such deductions were eliminated in 1988. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, 
c. 1 (U.K.). 
30. The Law Commissions Act, 1965, c. 22 (U.K.). 
31. LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION, supra note 27, at 103. 
32. Bribery in International Business: OECD Working Group on Bribery-Annual 
Report, OECD: BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES, http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
briberyininternationalbusiness/oecdworkinggrouponbribery-annualreport.htm (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2013). 
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laws on bribery of foreign public officials and on corporate 
liability for foreign bribery has hindered investigations. The 
Working Group reiterates its previous 2003,2005 and 2007 
recommendations that the UK enact new foreign bribery 
legislation at the earliest possible date.33 
D. Background on Revision of UK Corruption Laws 
69 
In 1995, two years prior to completing negotiations for the OECD 
Convention, the UK Parliament convened a Committee on Standards in 
Public Life to address allegations that public officials in England operated 
in "a pervasive atmosphere of 'sleaze', in which sexual, financial and 
governmental misconduct were indifferently linked. "34 Referring to opinion 
polling conducted in 1985 and 1994, the Committee noted that "comparing 
1985 with 1994, suggests that the level of public distrust of, and alienation 
from, [Members of Parliament], already high lO years ago, has grown 
substantially since."35 The report of its findings, known as the Nolan 
Report, recommended a reconsideration of the three corruption laws 
constituting the "Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916."36 A separate 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Standards in Public Life then reviewed 
the Nolan Report and confirmed the need to replace the century-old bribery 
acts, which had previously been called for nearly two decades earlier in the 
Salmon Report?7 The UK government then called upon the Law 
33. OECD, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BJS REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 4 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/23/20/41515077 .pdf. 
34. COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1995, ~ 10 
at 106 (U.K.). 
35. Id., ~ 16 at 107. 
36 See HOME OFFICE, THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION, CONSOLIDATION AND AMENDMENT 
OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACTS 1889-1916: A GoVERNMENT STATEMENT, June 
1997, available at http://www.publications.parliament.UK/pa/jtl99899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/ 
8012002.htm; see also THE LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY (LC 313) 12(2008-9) 
available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov. UK/docs/cp 185 _Reforming_ Bribery _report. pdf 
[hereinafter LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY 2008). 
37. "The Salmon Commission in 1976 recommended that such doubt should be resolved 
by legislation, but this has not been acted upon. We believe that it would be unsatisfactory to 
leave this issue outstanding when other aspects of the law of Parliament relating to conduct 
are being clarified. We recommend that the Government should now take steps to clarify the 
law relating to the bribery of or the receipt of a bribe by a Member of Parliament. This could 
usefully be combined with the consolidation of the statute law on bribery which Salmon also 
recommended, which the government accepted, but which has not been done. This might be 
a task which the Law Commission could take forward." COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN 
PUBLIC LIFE, STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1995, ~ 104 at 43 (U.K.). 
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Commission to reconsider these laws.38 
In March 1998, the Law Commission published an extensive report, 
"Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption,"39 which included a draft 
Corruption Bill. The Report was "welcomed" by the Government.40 A 
working group within the Government, established to draft a suitable law, 
apparently "worked" for five years to produce a draft of the bill, which 
"largely reflected the draft Bill appended to the [1998 Law] Commission's 
report.'.41 Although the Law Commission's analysis had been before 
Parliament and the public since March 1998, the reaction of a Parliamentary 
Joint Committee to the 2003 draft law was adverse.42 At the end of 2003, 
the Government issued a report challenging some of the Joint Committee's 
proposed amendments to the 2003 draft Corruption Bill and setting forth 
perceived shortcomings in the Joint Committee's adverse findings.43 
In December 2005, two years after the Joint Committee Report and 
eleven years after the United Kingdom signed the OECD Convention, the 
Government, through the Home Office, sought public comment (referred to 
in the United Kingdom as a "consultation") on the Prevention of Corruption 
Acts 1889-1916.44 By March 2007, thirty years after the FCPA was enacted, 
the results of this consultation were made public.45 The bottom line of the 
consultation was simply that there was no consensus on the approach a new 
act should take.46 
A significant development during this period, and one which appears 
to have moved the government and Parliament to finally take definitive 
action, was the BAE Systems plc ("BAE") bribery scandal. In December 
2004, BAE, the largest defense contractor in the United Kingdom, first 
publicly confirmed that it was being investigated by the Serious Fraud 
Office (the "SF0")47 for bribing public officials of Saudi Arabia in 
38. See, e.g., Bribery Bill, 2010, H.L. Bill [69] (Eng.); Ministry of Justice, Bribery: 
Draft Legislation, Explanatory Notes ~~ 5-6. 
39. LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION, supra note 27, 1998, The Law 
Commission 248 (U.K.). 
40. MONTY RAPHAEL, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE BRIBERY ACT,~ 2.63, at 23 (2010). 
41. /d. 
42. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL 
REPORT AND EVIDENCE, 2002-3, H.L. 157, H.C. 705 (U.K.). 
43. HOME DEPARTMENT,THE GOV'T REPLY TO THE REPORT FROM THE JOINT COMM. ON 
THE DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, 2002-3, H.L. 157, H.C. 705 (U.K.). 
44. HOME OFFICE, BRIBERY: REFORM OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACTS AND 
SFO POWERS IN CASES OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS: A CONSULTATION PAPER (Dec. 
2005), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/71 020623/1-BRIBERY -Reform-of-the-
Prevention-of-Corruption-Acts-and-SFO-. 
45. THE LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY: A CONSULTATION PAPER (LC185) 23 
(2007) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER) available at 
http :1/lawcommission.justice.gov. UK/docs/cp 185 _Reforming_ Bribery_ consultation. pdf. 
46. /d. at 25. 
47. The Serious Fraud Office is the UK entity that investigates and prosecutes serious 
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connection with a major defense contract known as the AL Yamamah 
transaction.48 The size of the alleged bribes, $1 billion, the alleged 
involvement of each British Prime Minister - Margaret Thatcher, John 
Major, and Tony Blair49 - and the television appearance of Saudi Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan apparently conceding the receipt of these bribes and 
saying "So what?"50 generated a great deal of media interest. 51 
Nevertheless, in December 2006 the Ministry of Justice announced 
that the SFO's investigation of BAE had been terminated.52 The 
cancellation of the investigation of BAE bribery immediately led to a 
challenge by two non-governmental organizations. 53 An April 2008 
decision of the High Court found that the SFO had improperly terminated 
its investigation.54 The House of Lords overturned this decision in July 
fraud and currently is responsible for enforcing the Bribery Act 2010. See Who We Are, 
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 
2012). The SFO was established by the Criminal Justice Act 1987. One of the functions of 
the office is to "investigate any suspected offence which appears to [the Director of the SFO] 
on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud." Criminal Justice Act, 1987, c. 
38, §1 (U.K.). 
48. The AI Yamamah transaction extended over several decades and involved BAE 
supplying military aircraft, air defense and other systems to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The Financial Times referred to this transaction as the "biggest sale ever, of anything, to 
anyone." David White & Robert Mauthner, Britain's Arms Sale Of The Century, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 9, 1988, at 7. 
49. Panorama's principal allegation is that BAE, with approval of the UK's Ministry of 
Defence, made payments worth hundreds of millions of pounds over two decades to bank 
accounts under the personal control of Prince Ban dar bin Sultan, the son of Prince Sultan bin 
Abdul Aziz who has been the Saudi Defence Minister since 1962. The documentary suggests 
that some of the payments were for the personal expenditure of Prince Bandar bin Sultan. 
The allegations raise further concerns about the shelving of the SFO investigation. They 
suggest that, since 1985, successive British governments under Prime Ministers Margaret 
Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair have used Ministry of Defence bank accounts to 
facilitate corrupt payments to a foreign official. The Story So Far ... Background to the 
legal challenge, CONTROL BAE REOPEN THE SAUDI CORRUPTION INQUIRY (Feb. 13, 2008), 
http://www.controlbae.org.UK/ backgroundlreview.php. 
50. Aljazeera News Arabic, Bandar Bin Sultan Saudi Money Is Mine and I Do What I 
Want With It, YouTuBE.COM (Jan. 10, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeXT3tuH6ls. 
51. See, e.g. Saudi Prince 'Received Arms Cash,' BBC NEWS (June 7, 2007), 
http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk _ news/6728773.stm 
52. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Systems PLC/Saudi Arabia (Dec. 14, 
2006), available at http://www.sfo.gov.UK!press-roorn/latest-press-releases/press-re1eases-
2006/bae-systems-plcsaudi-arabia. aspx. 
53. See The Story So Far ... Background to the Legal Challenge, CONTROL BAE REOPEN 
THE SAUDI CORRUPTION INQUIRY (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.controlbae.org.UK/background/ 
review.php. ("On 18 December 2006, four days after the SFO announcement, The Comer 
House and Campaign Against Arms Trade wrote to the UK Government arguing that the 
SFO's decision was unlawful and should be reversed. The legal challenge centred on the 
UK's obligations under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Anti-bribery Convention, which Britain signed in 1997."). 
54. R (on the Application of Comer House Research and Campaign Against Arms 
Trade) v. The Dir. of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] EWHC 714. 
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2008.55 It was during this four-year period of great public interest in the 
BAE matter that Parliament considered the Corruption Bill. 
In March 2007, the government once again asked the Law 
Commission to "undertake a thorough review of our bribery laws with a 
view to fundamental reform and in so doing to look at the full range of 
structural options for the scheme of bribery offences."56 Accordingly, in 
November 2007, the Law Commission sought public comment on its new 
analysis of the bribery laws through yet another consultation.57 One year 
later, in October 2008, the Law Commission once again published a report 
and proposed a draft law, this time focusing, not on "corruption," but 
specifically on bribery.58 Just a few months later, at the end of March 2009, 
the Ministry of Justice released its version of the bribery bill.59 A Joint 
Parliamentary Committee held further hearings on the March 2009 draft 
bribery bill and issued its final report in July 2009, thirty-two years after 
enactment of the FCPA.60 During these hearings, a prominent London 
lawyer in July 2009 gave testimony that presents an understated view of the 
long process that culminated in the introduction of the Bribery Act. 61 
Jeremy Carver, a former partner at Clifford Chance and prominent in the 
activities of Transparency International, an international anti-corruption 
organization, commented upon the years of delay, public consultations, and 
redrafts of the Bribery Bill: 
If any piece of legislation has been consulted on, it is this 
one. The difficulty, of course, has been that each body that 
has triggered a consultation, whether it is the Government, 
whether it is the Law Commission or previous 
parliamentary committees, has of course continued to 
receive the two points of view: one that says we must have 
legislation, it should be clear, it should be decisive and it 
should stop present malpractices, and the other says that, 
yes, we have legislation [sic] but basically we want to 
continue to do what we have always been doing and we do 
55. House of Lords, Session 2007-08 [2008] UKHL 60, R v Dir. of the Serious Fraud 
Office, [2008] UKHL 60, A.C. (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
56. Written Ministerial Statements, Envtl. Food and Rural Affairs, Envtl. Council (Mar. 
5, 2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.UK/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070305/ 
wmstext/70305m000 l.htm. 
57. See LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 45. 
58. See LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY 2008, supra note 36. 
59. Bribery Bill, 2010, H.L. Bill [69] (Eng.); Ministry of Justice, Bribery: Draft 
Legislation. 
60. JOINT COMMITTEE HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPoRT, H.C. 430-1 and H.L. 115-1 {U.K.). 
61. UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE PUBLISHED AS HC 430 VI 
(June 11, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.UK/pa/jt200809/jtselect/ 
jtbribe/uc430-vi!uc43002.htm. 
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not want to risk losing British business.62 
Four months later, the Bribery Bill 2009 was introduced into the 
House of Lords.63 From there, it was relatively speedily passed by both 
houses of Parliament, receiving Royal Assent on April 8, 2010. Even then, 
however, this law did not immediately go into effect. As described in Part 
III.C., infra, Section 9 of the Bribery Act required the government to 
publish guidance prior to the effective date of the Act to help businesses 
understand how to comply with the incomprehensible requirements of 
Section 7, the crime of failing to prevent bribery.64 The Ministry of Justice 
published final guidance to the Bribery Act 2010 on March 30, 2011 
("Guidance").65 The Bribery Act 2010 became effective on July 1, 2011.66 
Regardless of the years of delay, the Bribery Act is now in effect. We 
analyze the operative provisions of the Act in Parts II, III, and N, infra. 
II. BRIBERY ACT: SECTIONS 1, 2, AND 6 
In Part II, we discuss three of the four substantive provisions of the 
Bribery Act. Section 1 of the Act prohibits what has been referred to as 
"active" bribery - the offering or payment of something of value to 
another.67 Unlike the exclusively foreign focus of the FCPA, Section 1 
applies to domestic UK bribery as well.68 Section 2, dealing with "passive 
bribery," proscribes receipt of a bribe.69 This offense also has general 
applicability, including within the United Kingdom. Section 6 outlines the 
offense of bribing a foreign public official.70 
A. Section 1: Bribery of Another Person 
Section 1 sets forth the offense of bribing another person, or what is 
62. !d. 
63. See TIMOTHY EDMONDS & OONAGH GAY, BRIBERY BILL [HL], BILL No 69, 
RESEARCH PAPER 10/19 1, 6 (Mar. 2010). 
64. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7. 
65. See generally MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRffiERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (2010) 
[hereinafter Guidance] available at http://www.justice.gov.UK/down1oads/legislation/ 
bribery-act-20 1 0-guidance.pdf. See also Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 9. 
66. Guidance, supra note 65, at 2. 
67. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 1. 
68. Indeed, the first prosecution under the Bribery Act was for receipt of a domestic 
bribe by an administrative officer in a magistrate's court in Redgate, England. See Press 
release, The Crown Prosecution Service, Court officer admits taking bribe in first 
prosecution under Bribery Act (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.cps.gov.UK/news/ 
press _releases/127 _11/index.htrnl. 
69. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 2. 
70. !d.§ 6. 
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referred to as "active bribery."71 This section provides as follows: 
(1) A person ("P") is guilty of an offence if either of the 
following cases applies. 
(2) Case 1 is where-
( a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other 
advantage to another person, and 
(b) P intends the advantage-
(i) to induce a person to perform 
improperly a relevant function or activity, 
or 
(ii) to reward a person for the improper 
performance of such a function or activity. 
(3) Case 2 is where-
( a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other 
advantage to another person, and 
(b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the 
advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity. 
(4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom 
the advantage is offered, promised or given is the same 
person as the person who is to perform, or has performed, 
the function or activity concerned. 
(5) In cases 1 and 2 it does not matter whether the 
advantage is offered, promised or given by P directly or 
through a third party. 72 
Section 1 prohibits a person (either directly or indirectly) from 
offering, promising, or giving a financial or other advantage to another. 
This is a general bribery offense applicable both within the United 
Kingdom and abroad. An offense under Section 1 includes not only 
payments of money, but also offers, promises, or gifts of "financial or other 
advantage."73 Any such action constitutes a Bribery Act offense even 
without carrying through with the offer or promise of a payment or 
advantage; the offer or promise completes the offense.74 A Section 1 
offense is limited to circumstances where the party making the payment 
intends the "advantage" so proffered to induce the recipient to improperly 
perform an act or to reward the recipient for having done so.75 The offense 
is also completed when a party offers such an advantage knowing that 
71. Expansive Reach, supra note 8, at 325-26. 
72. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § I. 
73. !d. § 1(2)(a). 
74. !d. § 1(3). 
75. !d. § 1(2)(b ). 
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acceptance of the advantage will result in the improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity. 76 
The key distinction between case 1 and case 2 described in 
Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of the Act is the person to whom the 
advantage is offered. In case 1, it does not matter whether the person to 
whom the advantage is offered is the same person who is to perform, or has 
performed, the activity. In case 2, the person whose acceptance of the 
advantage constitutes an improper performance must be the same person to 
whom the advantage is offered. Moreover, in case 1, the advantage must be 
intended to induce or reward the improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity, whereas in case 2, the acceptance of the advantage 
itself is the improper performance. In summary, a person offering an 
"advantage" as described in Section 1 is guilty of active bribery if this was 
done with intent either to induce the recipient to act improperly or to reward 
the recipient for having done so. The offeror is also guilty of bribery where 
the recipient's acceptance or agreement to accept is itself improper. 
B. Section 2: Acceptance of a Bribe 
Section 2 of the Act describes the offense of "passive bribery," in 
which the perpetrator requests or agrees to receive a bribe. This section 
provides: 
( 1) A person ("R") is guilty of an offence if any of the 
following cases applies. 
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts 
a financial or other advantage intending that, in 
consequence, a relevant function or activity should be 
performed improperly (whether by R or another person). 
(3) Case 4 is where-
( a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a 
financial or other advantage, and 
(b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself 
constitutes the improper performance by R of a 
relevant function or activity. 
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts 
a financial or other advantage as a reward for the improper 
performance (whether by R or another person) of a relevant 
function or activity. 
( 5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of 
R requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or 
other advantage, a relevant function or activity is 
76. /d. § 1(3)(b). 
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( a) by R, or 
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(b) by another person at R's request or with R's 
assent or acquiescence. 
(6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter-
( a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts 
(or is to request, agree to receive or accept) the 
advantage directly or through a third party, 
(b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the 
benefit of R or another person. 
(7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or 
believes that the performance of the function or activity is 
Improper. 
(8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the 
function or activity, it also does not matter whether that 
person knows or believes that the performance of the 
function or activity is improper.77 
For this offense, one does not need to receive a bribe, but merely ask 
for or agree to receive it, and the bribe need not be monetary. It can be a 
simple "advantage." As with active bribery, the action must be improper: 
the actor needs to do, or intend to do, something wrong. The improper 
conduct could be intended to be done by a third party, or a third party could 
be the source of the bribe. 78 As we have noted elsewhere, "the irony of 
labeling this offense as passive bribery, and yet defining the four cases 
constituting varieties of the receipt of a bribe using the term 'requests,' was 
apparently lost on Parliament."79 As UK Professor Peter Alldridge has 
remarked: "Calling it passive bribery ... rather misses [the] point."80 
C. Sections 3 and 4: "Relevant Function or Activity" and "Improper 
Performance" 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act set forth the broad range of activities to 
which the Act applies and the meaning of "improper" performance as used 
in Section 1. As noted, a Section 1 offense is committed where the 
"advantage" is intended to either induce a person to perform improperly a 
relevant function or activity or reward a person for the improper 
performance of such a function or activity. 81 The same offense is committed 
77. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 2. 
78. /d. § 2(6). 
79. Expansive Reach, supra note 8. 
80. Peter Alldridge, Reforming Bribery: Law Commission Consultation Paper 185: (1) 
Bribery Reform and the Law-Again, 2008 CRIM. L. R. 671, 681 (2008). 
81. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 1(2)(b). 
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where a person offers, promises, or gives a financial or other advantage to 
another, and such person knows or believes that the acceptance of the 
advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity.82 
1. "Relevant Function " 
Section 3 provides: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a function or activity is a 
relevant function or activity if-
( a) it falls within subsection (2), and 
(b) meets one or more of conditions A to C. 
(2) The following functions and activities fall within this 
subsection-
( a) any function of a public nature, 
(b) any activity connected with a business, 
(c) any activity performed in the course of a 
person's employment, 
(d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a 
body of persons (whether corporate or 
unincorporate ). 
(3) Condition A is that a person performing the function or 
activity is expected to perform it in good faith. 
(4) Condition B is that a person performing the function or 
activity is expected to perform it impartially. 
(5) Condition Cis that a person performing the function or 
activity is in a position of trust by virtue of performing it. 
(6) A function or activity is a relevant function or activity 
even ifit-
(a) has no connection with the United Kingdom, 
and 
(b) is performed in a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom. 
(7) In this section "business" includes trade or profession. 83 
Thus, a "relevant function or activity" includes any public or business 
activity performed in the course of employment84 that also meets one of 
three conditions: it is normally expected to be performed in good faith, is 
performed impartially, or is performed by a person in a position oftrust.85 It 
82. !d.§ 1(2)(b),(3). 
83. !d. § 3. 
84. !d. 
85. !d. §3 (3, 4, 5). 
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must be emphasized that the acting party is guilty even where the relevant 
function or activity is carried out abroad; such activity need not have any 
connection to the United Kingdom, and the measure of what is "improper" 
is determined by UK standards, not by those of the foreign country where 
the bribing occurs.86 This application of UK standards to transactions 
occurring in foreign nations with different societal mores and cultures will 
doubtless trigger accusations of "cultural imperialism" comparable to those 
previously raised in connection with application of the FCP A. 87 
2. "Improper Performance" 
Section 4 provides: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a relevant function or 
activity-
( a) is performed improperly if it is performed in 
breach of a relevant expectation, and 
(b) is to be treated as being performed improperly 
if there is a failure to perform the function or 
activity and that failure is itself a breach of a 
relevant expectation. 
(2) In subsection (1) "relevant expectation"-
( a) in relation to a function or activity which meets 
condition A or B, means the expectation mentioned 
in the condition concerned, and 
(b) in relation to a function or activity which meets 
condition C, means any expectation as to the 
manner in which, or the reasons for which, the 
function or activity will be performed that arises 
from the position of trust mentioned in that 
condition. 
(3) Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising 
from or in connection with that person's past performance 
of a relevant function or activity is to be treated for the 
purposes of this Act as being done (or omitted) by that 
86. !d. §§ 4, 5. 
87. See, e.g., Christopher J. Duncan, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16F 
(2000); Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. 
J. INT'L L. 155, 156 (2009); Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and 
Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade against Corruption, 33 V AND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 881 (2000); see also Expansive Reach, supra note 8, at 328 n. 25. 
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person in the performance of that function or activity. 88 
Thus, according to this section, a relevant function or activity is 
performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation, 
or if there is a failure to perform the function or activity, and that failure is a 
breach of a relevant expectation.89 
3. "British "Expectations" 
Section 5 of the Act elaborates on the term "expectation," as that term 
is used in Sections 3 and 4, and makes perfectly clear that the test of what is 
expected is a test of expectations in the United Kingdom. 90 The full text of 
Section 5 is as follows: 
( 1) For the purposes of sections 3 and 4, the test of what is 
expected_is a test of what a reasonable person in the United 
Kingdom would expect in relation to the performance of 
the type of function or activity concerned. 
(2) In deciding what such a person would expect in relation 
to the performance of a function or activity where the 
performance is not subject to the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom, any local custom or practice is to be 
disregarded unless it is permitted or required by the written 
law applicable to the country or territory concerned. 
(3) In subsection (2) "written law" means law contained 
in-
(a) any written constitution, or provision made by 
or under legislation, applicable to the country or 
territory concerned, or 
(b) any judicial decision which is so applicable and 
is evidenced in published written sources.91 
Once again, the Bribery Act requires that UK standards apply to conduct 
that occurs in other nations. The breach of a relevant expectation, for 
purposes for Section 4, follows a reasonableness test, based only on what is 
considered "reasonable" in the United Kingdom, and any local custom or 
practice is generally to be disregarded. 
88. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 4. 
89. !d. 
90. !d. § 5(1). 
91. !d. § 5 (emphasis added). 
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D. Section 6: Bribery of a "Foreign Public Official" 
Section 6 of the Act is the section that most directly parallels the 
FCPA offense of bribery of a foreign public official. Section 6 describes 
this offense as follows: 
(1) A person ("P") who bribes a foreign public official 
("F") is guilty of an offence if P's intention is to influence F 
in F's capacity as a foreign public official. 
(2) P must also intend to obtain or retain-
( a) business, or 
(b) an advantage in the conduct ofbusiness. 
(3) P bribes F if, and only if-
( a) directly or through a third party, P offers, 
promises or gives any financial or other 
advantage-
(i) to F, or 
(ii) to another person at F's request or with 
F's assent or acquiescence, and 
(b) F is neither permitted nor required by the 
written law applicable to F to be influenced in F's 
capacity as a foreign public official by the offer, 
promise or gift. 
(4) References in this section to influencing F in F's 
capacity as a foreign public official mean influencing F in 
the performance of F's functions as such an official, which 
includes-
( a) any omission to exercise those functions, and 
(b) any use ofF's position as such an official, even 
if not within F's authority.92 
To trigger liability under the Bribery Act, the bribe must be paid to a 
foreign public official. Who qualifies as such an official is defined in 
Section 6(5): 
"Foreign public official" means an individual who--
(a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial 
position of any kind, whether appointed or elected, 
of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or 
territory), 
(b) exercises a public function-
92. !d. § 6(1)-(4). 
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(i) for or on behalf of a country or territory 
outside the United Kingdom (or any 
subdivision of such a country or territory), 
or 
(ii) for any public agency or public 
enterprise of that country or territory (or 
subdivision), or 
(c) is an official or agent of a public international 
organisation. 93 
81 
This definition closely tracks the definition included in the OECD 
Convention: 
For the purpose of this Convention: 
a) "foreign public official" means any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign 
country, whether appointed or elected; any person 
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including 
for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or 
agent of a public international organization.94 
A "public international organization" is defined in Section 6 of the Bribery 
Act: 
"Public international organisation" means an organisation 
whose members are any of the following-
(a) countries or territories, 
(b) governments of countries or territories, 
(c) other public international organisations, 
(d) a mixture of atiy ofthe above. 95 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice asserts in the Guidance that an 
offense under Section 6 has no jurisdictional limit: a foreign public official 
includes anyone, whether elected or appointed, who holds a legislative, 
administrative, or judicial position of any kind of a country or territory 
outside the United Kingdom, and includes: 
[A]ny person who performs public functions in any branch 
of the national, local or municipal government of such a 
93. ld. § 6(5). 
94. OECD Convention, Article 1, subsection 4(a), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (emphasis added). 
95. Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 6(6) (U.K.). 
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country or territory or who exercises a public function for 
any public agency or public enterprise of such a country or 
territory, such as professionals working for public health 
agencies and officers exercising public functions in state-
owned enterprises.96 
Such an official "can also be an official or agent of a public international 
organisation, such as the [United Nations] or the World Bank."97 
The policy underlying Section 6 addresses "the need to prohibit the 
influencing of decision making in the context of publicly funded business 
opportunities by the inducement of personal enrichment of foreign public 
officials or to [sic] others at the official's request. "98 While such activity is 
likely to involve conduct amounting to improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity, to which Section 1 applies, the Guidance explains that 
Section 6 does not require proof of improper performance or an intention to 
induce such performance. "[T]he exact nature of the functions of the 
persons regarded as foreign public officials is often very difficult to 
ascertain with any accuracy, and the securing of evidence will often be 
reliant on the co-operation of the state any such officials serve."99 The 
Guidance states that "it is not the Government's intention to criminalise 
behaviour where no such mischief occurs, but merely to formulate the 
offence to take account of the evidential difficulties referred to above."100 
However, this statement provides no useful "guidance" at all, and will serve 
only to trouble those who regularly interact with foreign public officials and 
will now have to worry about their every move. 
E. Section 12: Jurisdictional Nexus to the United Kingdom 
Section 12 sets forth the scope of jurisdiction of the various operative 
provisions of the Bribery Act. Subsections (1) through (4) apply to Sections 
1, 2, c and 6 of the Act and are standard and unexceptional. They provide as 
follows: 
Offenses under this Act: territorial application 
96. Guidance, supra note 65, at~ 22 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. This expands slightly on the text of the OECD Convention, which provides that a 
foreign public official means any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial 
office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public 
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any 
official or agent of a public international organization. OECD Convention, supra note 87, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. 
98. Guidance, supra note 65, at~ 23. 
99. Jd. 
100. Id. 
2013] UNSCREWING THE INSCRUTABLE 
(1) An offence is committed under section 1, 2 or 6 
in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern 
Ireland if any act or omission which forms part of 
the offence takes place in that part of the United 
Kingdom. 
(2) Subsection (3) applies if-
( a) no act or omission which forms part of 
an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 takes 
place in the United Kingdom, 
(b) a person's acts or omissions done or 
made outside the United Kingdom would 
form part of such an offence if done or 
made in the United Kingdom, and 
(c) that person has a close connection with 
the United Kingdom. 
(3) In such a case-
( a) the acts or omissions form part of the 
offence referred to in subsection (2)(a), and 
(b) proceedings for the offence may be 
taken at any place in the United Kingdom. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person 
has a close connection with the United Kingdom if, 
and only if, the person was one of the following at 
the time the acts or omissions concerned were done 
ormade-
(a) a British citizen, 
(b) a British overseas territories citizen, 
(c) a British National (Overseas), 
(d) a British Overseas citizen, 
(e) a person who under the British 
Nationality Act 1981 was a British subject, 
(f) a British protected person within the 
meaning of that Act, 
(g) an individual ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom, 
(h) a body incorporated under the law of 
any part of the United Kingdom, 
(i) a Scottish partnership. 
( 5) An offence is committed under section 7 
irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which 
form part of the offence take place in the United 
83 
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Kingdom or elsewhere. 101 
This jurisdictional nexus to the United Kingdom is traditional. The 
territorial basis for jurisdiction is explicit in Subsection (1 ). 102 Nationality 
jurisdiction is set out in Subsection (2).103 Under Subsection 2, a natural 
person subject generally to UK laws is subject to the Bribery Act even 
when acting outside the United Kingdom. These provisions are parallel to 
provisions of the FCPA as most recently amended in 1998 to comply with 
the OECD Convention.104 
Subsection (5), however, thrusts the Act into a new, perilously 
overbroad area of hitherto untested, and in our view unjustified jurisdiction. 
"An offence is committed under section 7 irrespective of whether the acts 
or omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere."105 This Parliamentary language contrasts starkly 
with the 1998 opinion of the legal experts on the Law Commission 
previously cited in Part I.C: "Under the present law, the English courts do 
not have jurisdiction to try a criminal offence unless the last act or event 
necessary for its completion occurs within the jurisdiction."106 
SFO Senior Staff have explained that the test for jurisdiction is 
whether the company in question carries out business in the United 
Kingdom, and that this is also a fact-specific inquiry to be made on a case-
by-case basis. 107 This means that to resolve each particular factual setting, 
the defendant non-UK business entity must go to trial - incurring 
significant costs and delays to determine whether it is actually subject to the 
expansive grasp of the Bribery Act. The SFO has also made quite clear that 
it "intends to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the Bribery 
Act."108 This jurisdictional overreach of the Bribery Act applies only to 
Section 7, which creates the unique, strict corporate liability crime of failing 
to prevent a bribe, which does not require fault or any inkling of mens rea. 
Given the central role of London in many aspects of international business, 
this crime may apply to almost all transnational businesses, including those 
with only the slightest connection to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as 
detailed in Part IV, infra, the Bribery Act's version of a "bribe" includes 
101. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 12. 
102. /d.§ 12(1). 
103. /d. § 12(2). 
104. See Prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by Persons Other Than Issuers or Domestic 
Concerns 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a), (f)(l) (2011). 
105. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 12(5) (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
106. THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 31, at 103. 
107. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 34. 
108. UK Serious Fraud Office Discusses Details of UK Bribery Act, GIBSON 
DUNN, http://www.gibsondunn.com/pub1icationslpages/UKSeriousFraudOfficeDiscussion-
RecentlyEnactedUKBriberyAct.aspx (Sept. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Dunn Article]. 
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expenditures routinely made by businesses today. 
III. SECTION 7: You ARE GUILTY 
The Bribery Act's Section 7, "Failure of commercial organisations to 
prevent bribery," is innovative, unprecedented, and indefensible as applied 
to non-UK registered businesses. It is a strict liability crime applicable to a 
business "doing business or a part of a business in the UK."109 While the 
Bribery Act has several unclear, ambiguous provisions, Section 7 is by far 
the most objectionable. As we explained in Part II.D, supra, Subsection 
12(5) of the Bribery Act imposes no territorial limits on the applicability of 
the unique crime of "failure to prevent bribery." As described more fully in 
Part IV B, infra, following its careful review of the issue, the Law 
Commission's draft bribery bill did not include strict liability for failing to 
prevent bribery. Because London is a world class financial center, travel 
hub, and attractive international destination, the crime of failing to prevent a 
bribe is potentially applicable to most of the world's business entities that 
have cross border operations. 
As its justification for asserting this vast extraterritorial reach for the 
Bribery Act, the SFO reported that it has been approached by UK 
companies complaining about competitors in foreign countries that are 
paying bribes. The SFO recognized the disadvantage compliance with the 
Act will pose and stated that one of its objectives is "to prevent ethical 
companies from being competitively disadvantaged by the actions of other 
companies whether they are within or outside the UK."110 This is somewhat 
ironic since no UK firm, including BAE, had ever been prosecuted in the 
United Kingdom for overseas bribery until 2009. This was twelve years 
after the OECD Convention was signed, when the first, and only, violation 
was penalized as the result of a company self-reporting a breach of the 
u111iedNatiol1srraq oil for Fooifsanct1ons.U 1 --- - - - - ---
we now tum to a closer analysis of the offending provisions of 
Section 7. This section reads in relevant part: 
(1) A relevant commercial organisation ("C") is guilty of 
an offence under this section if a person ("A") associated 
with C bribes another person intending-
( a) to obtain or retain business for C, or 
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct 
109. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(5). 
110. Dunn Article, supra note 108, at 4. 
111. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Maybe & Johnson Ltd: Former executives jailed 
for helping finance Saddam Hussein's government, (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.UK/press-room!latest-press-releases/press-releases-2011/mabey--johnson-
ltd-former-executives-jailed-for-helping-finance-saddam-hussein's-govemment.aspx. 
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ofbusiness for C. 
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated 
with C from undertaking such conduct. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another 
person if, and only if, A-
( a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under 
section 1 or 6 (whether or not A has been 
prosecuted for such an offence), or 
(b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 
12(2)(c) and (4) were omitted. 
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated 
with C and see section 9 for a duty on the Secretary of State 
to publish guidance. 112 
To fully appreciate the broad scope of Section 7, we need to determine the 
meaning of "relevant commercial organization" and of "person associated" 
with such an organization. In the Bribery Act, these terms are ambiguous, 
elusive, and open-ended. 
A. Relevant Commercial Organization 
The application of Section 7 to a UK commercial enterprise is not 
troubling. Such an organization is a "body which is incorporated under the 
law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business 
(whether there or elsewhere)," or "a partnership which is formed under the 
law of any part of the United Kingdom and which carries on a business 
(whether there or elsewhere)."113 This portion of the definition is 
unexceptional, reflecting traditional territorial jurisdiction. UK domiciled 
entities are subject to the strict criminal liability of Section 7 (with only the 
defense set out in Section 7(2)).114 It is well accepted that if an organization 
is established in any part of the "United Kingdom," Parliament has the 
power to legislate as it sees fit. 115 
As described infra, however, Parliament determined that Section 7 is 
equally applicable to "(b) any other body corporate (wherever 
incorporated) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part 
of the United Kingdom, [or] ... (d) any other partnership (wherever 
112. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(1-4) (emphasis added). 
113. /d. § 7(5). 
114. /d. § 7(2). 
115. The term "United Kingdom" is defined in Section 12 of the Bribery Act as England, 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, and does not include British "overseas territories" 
such as Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, or the British Virgin Islands. See /d. § 12. 
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formed) which carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the 
United Kingdom .... "116 Jurisdiction over a non-UK company "which carries 
on a business" in the United Kingdom is unobjectionable. The overly broad 
aspect of this provision is found in the phrase "which carries on ... part of a 
business, in any part of the United Kingdom." 117 We find no explanation of 
what "carries on ... part of a business" might entail in either the Act or the 
Guidance. Speeches by current and former UK officials from the SFO or 
Ministry of Justice similarly offer no useful clue to the meaning of this 
phrase.118 The Ministry of Justice did seek to ease concerns by stating: 
The Government would not expect. . . the mere fact that a 
company's securities have been ... admitted to trading on 
the London Stock Exchange, in itself, to qualify that 
company as carrying on a business or part of a business in 
the UK and therefore falling within the definition of a 
'relevant commercial organisation' for the purposes of 
section 7. 119 
This should have been good news for the many foreign companies 
which have secured listings on, for example, the London Stock Exchange. 
However, Richard Alderman, at the time head of the SFO, the agency 
principally charged with enforcing the Bribery Act, flatly contradicted the 
Ministry by stating his view of SFO jurisdiction. 
Asked whether all companies listed in the UK 
potentially fall under the remit of the Bribery Act, he said: 
"Exactly. You bet we will go after foreign companies. This 
has been misunderstood. If there is an economic 
J~_ngag~mt;:l1Lwitl1_ the _ _ __ Ql( __ then in l11Y __ yie\V they are 
carrying on business in the UK. 120 
116. !d. §§ 7(5)(b), 7(5)(d) (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
117. !d. (emphasis added). 
118. See, e.g., Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech at British Bankers 
Association Financial Crime Office, (Nov. 29, 2011) available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ 
about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2011/british-bankers'-association-financial-
crime-conference.aspx; Bribery Act In Force July 2011: Ken Clark's Statement In Full, 
THEBRlBERACT.COM (last visited Sept. 26, 2012 5:34 PM) http://thebriberyact.com/ 
20 l1/03/30/bribery-act-in-force-from-ju1y-1-ken-clarkes-statement-in-full/ (last visited Nov. 
7, 2012). 
119. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 36. 
120. Jonathan Russell, Serious Fraud Office Risks Clash with Ministry of Justice over 
Bribery Act, THE TELEGRAPH, (Jul. l, 2011, 5:45 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/ 
finance/yourbusiness/bribery-act/8609486/Serious-Fraud-Office-risks-clash-with-Ministry-of-
Justice-over-Bribery-Act.html. "Foreign companies with any kind of business link with the UK 
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If a listing on a stock exchange in London fits within this new term, 
"economic engagement," what about a syndicated credit facility that 
includes London banks? What about the occasional sale of a product or the 
increasingly common provisions in international agreements which provide 
for dispute resolution in London, either in the Commercial Courts or at the 
London Court of International Arbitration? Perhaps the English courts will 
one day resolve this uncertainty. 121 For the present it is extremely unsettling 
for companies that might be ensnared by Alderman's grandiose view of his 
jurisdiction under the Bribery Act to see authoritative UK spokesmen 
expounding inconsistent views on what is, by any measure, an 
extraordinarily far-reaching provision. 
B. "Adequate Procedures " Defense 
Parliament claimed to ameliorate the draconian impact of the 
automatic imposition of criminal liability for failing to prevent a bribe by 
offering one possible defense to the crime, the marvelously labeled 
"adequate procedures" defense. Section 7(2) provides, "But it is a defence 
for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent 
persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct." 122 With the 
establishment of the strict liability Section 7 offense, when seeking to find 
liability in a legal entity, the prosecutor need no longer search for the person 
representing the "controlling mind" of the company.123 No criminal intent 
or knowledge, no guilty mind or mens rea, is required for this crime. If a 
"bribe" within the Bribery Act's very broad meaning of that term occurs,124 
have been put on notice by the head of the Serious Fraud Office that they will be fair game once 
the biggest overhaul of the nation's bribery laws in a generation comes into force. Richard 
Alderman, the agency's director, is charging his investigators with rooting out bribery anywhere 
in the world when the legislation is introduced on July 1. The Bribery Act's sweeping powers 
mean that companies based overseas come under the SFO's jurisdiction if they have any 
business link with the UK, such as being listed here." Caroline Binham, SFO Chief Warns of 
New Global Reach, FINANCIAL TIMES (May. 23, 2011, 10:34 pm), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/8c056ce2-8562-11 e0-ae32-00 144feabdc0.htrnl#axzz 1 irn4Khs Y A. 
121. See, e.g., GUIDANCE, supra note 65, 1[ 34 "The courts will be the final arbiter as to 
whether an organization 'carries on a business' in the UK taking into account the particular 
facts in individual cases." !d.; Dunn Article, supra note 108, at 2 ("However, they made 
clear that the test for jurisdiction is simply whether the company in question carries out 
business in the United Kingdom. They noted that case law relating to this question will not 
necessarily be relevant to determining jurisdiction, and this will be a matter of fact in each 
case, clarifying that the SFO intends to assert broad jurisdiction under the provisions of the 
Bribery Act."). 
122. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(2). 
123. The "controlling mind" element of a corporate prosecution under prior UK law 
required proof that a very senior executive of the defendant corporation actively and 
knowingly affected the bribe. This is the stated explanation for why there were so few 
corporate defendants prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916. See, 
e.g., Tesco Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1971] A.C. 153 (H.L.) 160-61 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
124. For discussion of grease and hospitality payments, see Part IV A., infra. 
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the corporate or other commercial entity is guilty, despite having no 
knowledge of the alleged bribe and despite having taken no affirmative act 
in connection with this "crime." To avoid this automatic guilty verdict, the 
company must prove that it "had in place adequate procedures designed to 
prevent persons associated with [the company] from undertaking such 
conduct."125 
Use of the term "adequate" is curious, since obviously had the 
procedures actually been adequate, the bribery would not have occurred in 
the first place. 126 Substitution of the term "reasonable" was considered and 
rejected in Parliament. 127 The UK Law Commission published a Summary 
of its Recommendations, which explained the Section 7 defense in the 
following terms: "[I]t will generally be sufficient guidance to those in a 
position to make payments to say: Do not make payments to someone (or 
favour them in any other way) if you know that this will involve someone in 
misuse of their position." 128 However, this statement is perfectly circular. 
To say one cannot engage in bribery because it is bribery is unusually 
unhelpful. When the Law Commission Report was being considered by 
legislators, testimony to the Joint Committee of Parliament considering the 
draft Bribery Bill challenged the public policy basis of Section 7: "We fail 
to see why public policy should require that individual's actions be 
crirninalized and for the individual to then to rely on a prosecutor's 
discretion, on whether with hindsight, the public interest requires a 
prosecution."129 The final version of the Act retained the strict liability 
provision of the draft along with the adequate procedures defense. 
C. The Ministry of Justice's "Guidance" 
In the clearest possible acknowledgement of the unique challenge 
posed by Section 7 and its sole affirmative defense, Parliament included in 
the Act a highly unusual provision. Section 9130 requires that the UK 
125. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(2). 
126. See Joseph Heller, Catch 22 (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1955). 
127. PUBLIC BILL COMMITTEE, BRIBERY BILL AMENDMENTS, H.C. 55-69 
(Mar. 16, 2010) (U.K.), available at http://www.pub1ications.parliament.uk/palcm200910/ 
cmpublic/bribery/1 00316/prn/1 00316s03.htm 
128. THE LAW COMMISSION, REFORMING BRIBERY (LAW COM NO 313), 
2008, at xvii, (U.K.) available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp185_ 
Reforming_ Bribery _report. pdf. 
129. Memorandum submitted by Herbert Smith LLP to Joint Comm., (BB 49) (Jun. 
2009) available at http://www. publications. parliament. uklpaljt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/memo/ 
430/ucm4902.htm (U.K.). 
130. Section 9 provides, in relevant part: "The Secretary of State must publish guidance 
about procedures that relevant commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons 
associated with them from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1)." Bribery Act, supra note 2, 
§ 9. 
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government provide guidance to the business community to explain how to 
comply with the strict liability offense of "Failing to Prevent Bribery." 
Upon careful review of the Ministry of Justice Guidance, published in final 
form in March 2011, eleven months after the Bribery Act was enacted, one 
can only conclude that the Guidance is not a useful guide to complying with 
the Act and avoiding Section 7 liability. 
In his March 2011 Introduction to the final Guidance, Kenneth 
Clarke, the Justice Minister, offered this disclaimer of responsibility: "The 
question of whether an organisation had adequate procedures in place to 
prevent bribery in the context of a particular prosecution is a matter that can 
only be resolved by the courts taking into account the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case. " 131 Thus, the Justice Minister confirmed that the 
question of how a company is to comply with Section 7 of the Act is 
actually impossible to describe. While the Guidance characterizes Section 
7(2) as a "full defense" to a violation of the strict liability crime of failing to 
prevent bribery, it makes clear that the burden is on the guilty organization 
to prove this defense providing that "[i]n accordance with established case 
law, the standard of proof which the commercial organisation would need 
to discharge in order to prove the defence, in the event it was prosecuted, is 
the balance of probabilities."132 
Rather than offering a clear route to satisfactory compliance with 
Section 7, something we may presume Parliament had in mind when it 
required the Guidance to be published prior to the entire Act becoming 
effective,133 the Justice Ministry's Guidance simply repeats that the 
seemingly impossible burden is upon the guilty company to prove that its 
procedures were adequate, despite the failure of those procedures. While the 
Guidance offers six principles that serve as criteria to be used in 
determining whether companies had in place "proportionate procedures" for 
preventing bribery, the Ministry acknowledged that these principles "are 
intended to be flexible and outcome focused, allowing for the huge variety 
of circumstances that commercial organisations find themselves in."134 
Thus, companies cannot practically rely on the Guidance to assist them with 
the "huge variety" of scenarios in which they might find themselves. 
It bears emphasizing that the Guidance itself, while mandated by 
Section 9,135 is not law, does not have the force of law, and merely 
expresses what some in the current Government think, hope, or believe. 
Even if the Guidance was clear, and it is not, it could not be relied upon. 
131. See GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 4. 
132. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 33. 
133. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 9. 
134. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at p. 20. 
135. "The Secretary of State must publish guidance about procedures that relevant 
commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons associated with them from 
bribing as mentioned in section 7(1)." Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, § 9 (U.K.). 
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The Courts may find it interesting that the Guidance provides that decisions 
to prosecute must be guided by a "common sense" approach. 136 But this is 
not an especially useful guide for business, and the courts will certainly 
come to their own independent conclusions. Governments change. And 
once an ambitious prosecutor has made the decision to proceed under a 
particular set of attractive facts, and the media seek to boost sales by hyping 
another "corporate scandal" on its 24/7 news cycle, stale statements of the 
intentions of a prior government will likely provide little protection for a 
business automatically found guilty under Section 7. 
N. So THEN, WHAT IS "BRIBERY?" 
Our review of the phrase "part of a business" in Part liLA. supra 
established that almost any commercial organization engaged in 
international business may find itself subject to prosecution under the 
Bribery Act. Given the unhelpful nature of the Guidance and the apparent 
attempt by Parliament to regulate international transactions with precious 
little connection with the United Kingdom, it is vital to fully understand just 
how broad the scope of the term "bribe" is as used in the Act if a company 
is to avoid the unlimited fines of the automatic crime of failing to prevent a 
bribe. 
A. The New Definition of Bribe 
Section 7 applies to a "relevant commercial organization."137 In the 
globalized world of the twenty-first century where, for many purposes, 
electronic communications and the ease of international travel have 
virtually eliminated sovereign borders for businesses, any "relevant 
commercial organization," no matter its jurisdiction of organization or its 
primary business focus, may become subject to the Bribery Act if it can be 
argued that such organization does "part" of its business in the UK. Given 
the borderless application of the Bribery Act promised by its enforcers, we 
do need to understand the boundaries of what constitutes an actionable 
"bribe" under the Act. To make clear the expansive scope of the Bribery 
Act, we consider the meaning of "associated person," and two additional 
terms: "facilitation" payments and "hospitality" expenses. 
1. "Associated Person" 
Section 7 provides that the act constituting the alleged "bribe" 
136. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 2, 15. "And, as I hope this guidance shows, 
combating the risks of bribery is largely about common sense, not burdensome procedures." 
GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at 2. 
137. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 7(5). 
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triggering potential criminal liability can be made by "a person associated 
with" such organization as long as that person had the intent to obtain or 
retain business or an "advantage" for such organization.138 The Bribery Act 
defines an "associated person" in Section 8: 
(1) For the purposes of section 7, a person ("A") is 
associated with C if (disregarding any bribe under 
consideration) A is a person who performs services for or 
on behalf of C. 
(2) The capacity in which A performs services for or on 
behalf of C does not matter. 
(3) Accordingly A may (for example) be C's employee, 
agent or subsidiary. 
(4) Whether or not A is a person who performs services for 
or on behalf of C is to be determined by reference to all the 
relevant circumstances and not merely by reference to the 
nature of the relationship between A and C. 
(5) But if A is an employee of C, it is to be presumed 
unless the contrary is shown that A is a person who 
performs services for or on behalf of C.139 
The potential for expansive use of this definition by SFO prosecutors is 
starkly evident. Subsection (4) explains that "all the relevant circumstances" 
are more significant than the nature of the actual relationship of that 
individual to the organization. This renders the term "associated person" 
even more ambiguous and significantly expands the potential reach of this 
strict criminal law. 140 Based upon a straightforward reading of Subsection 
8( 5), executives and other employees of an organization are presumed to be 
associated with an organization. 141 We have to accept that all employees, 
even temporary or part-time employees, are subject to the presumption in 
Subsection 8( 5) that places the burden of proof upon the company to 
establish that the particular employee who is said to have effected a bribe 
was not, under "all the relevant circumstances," performing services "for or 
on behalf of' the company. 
138. !d. § 7(1 )(a)-(b ). 
139. !d.§ 8. 
140. It is interesting to note that, Richard Alderman, SFO Chief until April 2012, has 
contested the fairly obvious conclusion that the Bribery Act contains a number of 
ambiguities. Alderman has said: "Let me also say that I disagree with the comment that the 
Bribery Act is unclear. It is a model of clarity and has been widely praised." Mike Koehler, 
A Conversation with Richard Alderman - Director of the United Kingdom Serious Fraud 
Office, at 5 (Oct. 4, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=l687299. 
141. Bribery Act, supra note 2, § 8(5). 
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But who or what is an agent under Subsection (3) of Section 8? In the 
FCPA, "agent" likewise is not defined. 142 However, the US common-law 
definition of "agent" would likely be applied to the FCP A. Under the 
common law, "[a]n agent is a person or entity that has been either explicitly 
or implicitly authorized to act on behalf of [a principal]"; "[ w ]hen the agent 
acts within the scope of its authority, the principal can be held liable for the 
agent's actions."143 As reported FCPA cases reveal, local "consultants" 
have been used in an attempt to circumvent the FCPA's bribe standard. 144 
Hiring local persons to act on behalf of a company is a common practice in 
international business. Having such persons handle payments to local 
officials is a practice well known to prosecutors. Including local consultants 
who clearly do perform services for a business as "agents" for purposes of 
determining "associated person" is essential and not at all controversial. 
However, business in the twenty-first century also necessarily involves 
reliance upon many other types of what may be colloquially referred to as 
agents. These may include a very wide scope of persons and other 
businesses - delivery and maintenance people, designers, computer 
programmers, etc., all of whom perform services and may thus be deemed 
"associated" with a business. Commercial organizations, subject to, or that 
may be subject to, the Act would certainly benefit from useful guidance on 
how to avoid liability when dealing with such agents. 
With respect to the term "subsidiary" in Subsection 8(3), Parliament 
has not singled this term out for special treatment, but rather, has lumped 
subsidiaries together with "employee" and "agent." It is logical to agree 
with Parliament's decision to overcome the long-standing fictional 
"separate existence" of a corporate subsidiary and to accept that acts taken 
by a wholly-owned subsidiary are, in fact, acts done "for or on behalf of" its 
----- --- - -----
142. The FCPA provides, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any domestic concern ... , or for any 
officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern ... , to make use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, [or] promise to pay ... anything of value to ... any person, while knowing that all 
or a portion of such money ... will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to 
any foreign official ... for purposes of ... influencing any act or decision of such foreign 
official ... in his ... official capacity .... " Anti-Bribery and Books & Records Provisions 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by 
Domestic Concerns, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2004). 
143. Joseph P. Covington ET AL., JENNER & BLOCK'S FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT (FCPA) BUSINESS GUIDE, 15 (2012), available at http://jenner.com/ 
system/assets/assets/6349/original/Jenner _20 _ 26 _ 20B1ock _ 20FCPA _ 20Business _ 20Guide _ 
2012.pdf?l334067320 (citing JONATHAN M. PURVER, AMERICAN JURISPURDENCE 
PROOF OF FACTS, LIABILITY OF PARENT CORPORATION FOR ACTS OF 
SUBSIDIARY, § 2 (2d 2009)). 
144. See, e.g., Sherman & Sterling, LLP, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases 
Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign CorrnptPractices Act of 1977, 
FCPA Digest, Jan. 3, 2012, at 2, 22, (discussing United States v. Maxwell Technologies, No. 
3:11-00329 (S.D. Cal. 2011)). 
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parent. 145 Genuine questions, however, arise under Section 8 for joint 
ventures and for subsidiaries that are not wholly-owned. Where ownership 
of a subsidiary is shared with others, the subsidiary may well still be 
performing services for or on behalf of the company. Is that partial parent 
always to be held responsible for bribes made by such subsidiary? Even for 
entities organized under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction? Even for bribes 
completely unrelated to the services such subsidiary or joint venture does 
perform for the company? Even when the company has "adequate 
procedures" overall, but because of its partial ownership arrangement, does 
not have operational control of the joint venture or subsidiary where the 
bribe occurred? These questions arise because the Act does not specify 
what is to be done when such situations arise, and the Guidance does not 
help at all. 
The Guidance does not distinguish between wholly-owned and 
partially-owned subsidiaries. 146 Rather, the Ministry of Justice focuses on 
the overall intent requirement of the Act, stating that "[ w ]ithout proof of the 
required intention [to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the 
conduct of business for the organization], liability will not accrue through 
simple corporate ownership or investment, or through the payment of 
dividends or provision of loans by a subsidiary to its parent."147 The 
Ministry further states, in unhelpful language, that the question of 
"adequacy of bribery prevention procedures will depend in the final 
analysis on the facts of each case, including matters such as the level of 
control over the activities of the associated person ... "148 Thus, the 
Ministry once again states the not-so-helpful assertion that ultimate liability 
is fact-specific, will rest on the context of each case, and thus must be 
determined by a court. 
Further questions concern entities in a company's supply chain. As 
the Guidance points out, "an organisation is likely only to exercise control 
over its relationship with its contractual counterparty" and persons who 
contract with that counterparty "will be performing services for the 
counterparty and not for other persons in the contractual chain."149 The 
confusion arising from the numerous parties that may be involved in such 
transactions would provide an aggressive prosecutor with an opportunity to 
expand the scope of the Act even further. While many laws that businesses 
145. See, e.g., Mazza v. Verizon Washington D.C., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 
2012) ("Disregarding the separate identities of a corporate parent and its subsidiary is ... a 
rare exception grounded in equity considerations, and is only to be applied when adherence 
to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would sanction a fraud or promote 
injustice." /d. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
146. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~~ 33-43. 
147. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 42. 
148. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 43. 
149. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 39. 
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face are carefully crafted with somewhat ambiguous terms, providing 
prosecutors with the flexibility essential to address novel situations, Section 
7 of the Bribery Act establishes a corporate crime requiring no affirmative 
act and with no element of mens rea. Thus, the possibility exists that a 
person only marginally associated with a company which is only marginally 
connected to the United Kingdom, may commit an act, whether deliberately 
or inadvertently, that triggers the strict criminal liability and unlimited fines 
of the Bribery Act. Such ambiguities in the Act are ill-advised. 
2. Facilitation Payments 
Unlike the FCP A, which explicitly permits facilitation payments, 150 
the Bribery Act provides no exception for what are referred to as "grease 
payments," "speed money," "tea money," or "facilitation payments." As 
described in the FCPA, these are the payments made to facilitate or 
expedite routine government action that international travelers may 
experience even in non-commercial circumstances.151 The Ministry of 
Justice, in an attempt to justify the Act's hardline stance on facilitation 
payments, provides in the Guidance: 
As was the case under the old law, the Bribery Act does not 
(unlike US foreign bribery law) provide any exemption for 
such payments. The 2009 Recommendation of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] recognises the corrosive effect of facilitation 
payments and asks adhering countries to discourage 
companies from making such payments. Exemptions in this 
context create artificial distinctions that are difficult to 
enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures, 
confuse anti-bribery communication with employees and 
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (1998). For a description of the 
legislative history of the PCP A as it relates to facilitation payments and the addition in 1988 
of explicit language authorizing these payments, see Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka 
Mrdjenovic, Don't You Forget About Me: The Continuing Viability of the FCPA 's 
Facilitating Payments Exception, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 19, 19 (2012) available at 
http:l/moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/06/Furthennore.Diamant.pdf. 
151. The PCP A defines "routine governmental action" as "only an action which is 
ordinarily and commonly perfonned by a foreign official in-(i) obtaining permits, licenses, 
or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) 
processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police 
protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country; (iv) providing phone 
service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable 
products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature." 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A)(i}-(v), 78dd-3(f)(4)(A), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A). 
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other associated persons, perpetuate an existing 'culture' of 
bribery and have the potential to be abused. 152 
The Guidance explains that these payments could trigger either the Section 
6 offense or, "where there is an intention to induce improper conduct, 
including where the acceptance of such payments is itself improper, the 
section 1 offense and therefore potential liability under section 7."153 
Various explanations of the United Kingdom's position on facilitation 
payments, however, contain acknowledgements that a strict prohibition of 
all such payments will not be easily enforced. The Home Office noted in its 
December 2005 invitation for consultation on bribery and corruption laws: 
There is no exemption for facilitation payments under our 
law: the making of any payment would be an offence under 
our law, if corruptly made. However, given the need to be 
realistic about the situations that may be faced in some 
overseas countries, the following statement has been made, 
with the agreement of the Director ofPublic Prosecutions: 
"We do not think it is desirable for UK law to apply 
differently overseas to the way it applies in the UK. We do 
not tolerate "facilitation payments" to UK officials. 
However it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which 
the making of a small "facilitation payment", extorted by a 
foreign official in countries where this is normal practice, 
would of itself give rise to a prosecution in the VK._The 
making of such payments may well, however, be illegal 
under the law of the country concerned. "154 
Likewise, Richard Alderman, Director of the SFO at the time the 
Guidance was first published, acknowledged the difficulty with prohibiting 
facilitation payments, stating in part: 
I do not expect facilitation payments to end the moment the 
Bribery Act comes into force. What I do expect though is 
for corporates who do not yet have a zero tolerance 
approach to these payments, to commit themselves to such 
an approach and to work on how to eliminate these 
152. Guidance, supra note 65, ~ 45. 
153. Guidance, supra note 65, ~ 44. 
154. Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery of 
Foreign Officials - A Consultation Paper, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, ~ 27 (Dec. 2005), 
(emphasis added). 
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payments over a period of time. 155 
Mr. Alderman has never explained how his "zero tolerance" for facilitation 
payments could be implemented "over a period of time" while complying 
with the absolute prohibition of such payments under the Act. Alderman's 
"solution" is one only a government regulator, totally immersed in the 
politics of London and totally removed from the realities of the world 
outside London, could offer. 
As mentioned above, the United States' FCPA explicitly does not 
prohibit "facilitating" or "expediting" payments made to government 
officials for performing clerical or ministerial activities, or other "routine 
governmental actions."156 However, in practice, the precise meaning of 
"facilitating" payment under the FCPA remains unclear. The exception has 
been narrowed by government enforcement actions and settlements. 157 In its 
Bribery Act Guidance, the Ministry of Justice does not shed light on 
Alderman's "zero tolerance" approach to facilitation payments.158 Rather, it 
ignores the conclusions ofthe Home Office in 2005159 and informs us that 
"[e]xemptions in this context create artificial distinctions that are difficult to 
enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures, confuse anti-bribery 
communication with employees and other associated persons, perpetuate an 
existing 'culture' of bribery and have the potential to be abused."160 It is 
surely exasperating for businesses seeking to comply with the Bribery Act 
to realize that the Act flatly outlaws and thus automatically criminalizes, 
what Parliament and the SFO acknowledge are common practices around 
the world. 
Mr. Alderman's prosecutors did offer criteria that they would 
consider in evaluating whether to prosecute a company that does make 
facilitation payments after the effective date of the Bribery Act. 
Specifically, the SFO has said that it would examine: 
1. whether the company has a clear issued policy regarding 
such payments, 
2. whether written guidance is available to relevant 
155. Richar Alderman, Director, Serious Fraud Office, Hosted by Salans, Managing 
corruption risk in the real world, (Apr. 7, 2011) (emphasis added) available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/directof'l/o27s-speeches/speeches-2011/salans---bribery-
act-20 1 O.aspx. 
156. See 15 U.S. C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b); see infra note 170. 
157. See e.g., Cheryl A. Krause & Elisa T. Wiygul, FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing 
"Facilitating Payments" Exception?, FiN. FRAUD L. REP., 730, 730-31 (2010). available at 
http:/ /www.dechert.com/fi1es/Publication/53b317c3-d963-4ca6-9cbc-23cc76fa60d2/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/12e5a22a-daea-4d72-adc 1-3048bfa33fb2/FCP A %20Compliance.pdf. 
158. Infra note 175. 
159. Infra note 174. 
160. Guidance, supra note 65, at '1)45. 
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employees as to the procedure they should follow when 
asked to make such payments, 
3. whether such procedures are being followed by 
employees, 
4. if there is evidence that all such payments are being 
recorded by the company, 
5. if there is evidence that proper action (collective or 
otherwise) is being taken to inform the appropriate 
authorities in the countries concerned that such 
payments are being demanded, 
6. whether the company is taking what practical steps it 
can to curtail the making of such payments. 161 
If the SFO is satisfied with the answers to these questions, the company, 
while still in technical breach of the law, will not be prosecuted for making 
facilitation payments. As noted, there is no current guidance, learning, or 
lore on what are the "practical steps" demanded by item 6 in this list to 
eliminate such a ubiquitous practice. Even if such practical steps as might 
be created did satisfy prosecutors at the SFO, this is far from a "safe 
harbor." Prosecutors change, especially recently at the SF0. 162 Perhaps 
more important, business involves economic risk taking. Adding regulatory 
and legal uncertainty to these economic risks must, at the margin, hurt 
business. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom's past treatment of facilitation 
payments demonstrates that it has not actually taken the hardline approach 
that it is now propounding. While it is technically true that facilitation or 
"grease" payments have always been prohibited under English law, it is 
equally true that no prosecutions were ever attempted for such payments 
made overseas. Furthermore, notwithstanding the Justice Ministry's citing 
of the 2009 OECD "Recommendation," the OECD Convention does not 
require that these payments be outlawed. Commentary 9 to the OECD 
Convention as originally published provided: 
Small "facilitation" payments do not constitute payments 
made "to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage" within the meaning of paragraph 1 and, 
161. See Barry Viton & Richard Kovalevsky Q.C., Facilitation Payments, 
THEBRIBERYACT.COM, http://thebriberyact.com/facilitation-payments/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013). 
162. The following senior officials at the SFO have recently left the SFO: Kathleen 
Harris, former Head of SFO Fraud Business Group, now at Arnold & Porter-London; 
Charles Montieth, SFO's former Head of Assurance, now at White & Case; Robert Amaee, 
now at Covington & Burling; Helen Garlick, former SFO assistant director, now at Fulcrum 
Chambers; Richard Alderman, former Head ofSFO 2008-2012, now retired. 
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accordingly, are also not an offence. Such payments, 
which, in some countries, are made to induce public 
officials to perform their functions, such as issuing licenses 
or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country 
concerned. Other countries can and should address this 
corrosive phenomenon by such means as support for 
programmes of good governance. However, criminalisation 
by other countries does not seem a practical or effective 
1 . 163 comp ementary actiOn. 
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While this statement criticized facilitation payments, calling them a 
"corrosive phenomenon," neither this revised statement nor the Convention 
calls for their criminalization. Moreover, the revised 2009 language of 
Commentary 9 cited in the Guidance merely states that such payments are 
"generally illegal in the foreign country concerned but are tolerated for 
many reasons when made to induce public officials to perform their official 
functions," and, like the original commentary, states that "criminalisation 
by other countries does not seem a practical or effective complementary 
action."164 
In fact, the OECD Council's most recent stance on facilitation 
payments, set forth in a formal Recommendation in November 2009,165 
contained only the following: 
VI. [The Council] RECOMMENDS, in view of the 
corrosive effect of small facilitation payments, particularly 
on sustainable economic development and the rule of law 
that Member countries should: 
i) undertake to periodically review their policies 
_ and_ approach on_ small _facilitation payments m 
order to effectively combat the phenomenon; 
ii) encourage companies to prohibit or 
discourage the use of small facilitation payments 
in internal company controls, ethics and 
compliance programmes or measures, recognising 
that such payments are generally illegal in the 
countries where they are made, and must in all 
163. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and 
Related Documents, OECD.ORG, 15 (2011), http://www.oecdorg/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf 
See also Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation Payments and 
the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corropt 
Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 881, 896-97 (2011 ). 
164. OECD, supra note 156, at 15. See also Jordan, supra note 156, at 896-902. 
165. OECD, supra note 156, at 22. 
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cases be accurately accounted for in such 
companies' books and financial records. 166 
By flatly calling for the end of facilitation payments overseas and for 
criminalizing those who fail to prevent them, Parliament has gone well 
beyond the OECD's call to "encourage companies to prohibit or 
discourage" facilitation payments. Where the OECD has urged companies 
to take steps to "prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation 
payments," Parliament has, we believe, consciously taken the politically 
expedient, but completely unrealistic, position of making it a crime to make 
such payments. Bribery and corruption have been part of human society for 
thousands of years. 167 For certain, more than 30 years of experience with 
the PCP A has not led to any perceptible reduction in the amount of 
corruption in international business. 
Moreover, the SFO Senior Staff has "stated that a company's policies 
should address the possibility of such payments being made, incorporating 
the relevant [Attorney General] and Ministry of Justice Guidance in this 
regard."168 The Staff explained that the SFO takes a sympathetic approach 
toward "emergency facilitation payments," and offered an example: a 
visitor to a foreign country requires an inoculation and is offered the choice 
of paying $5 to be inoculated with a clean needle, or not paying and being 
inoculated with a used needle. They stated that in this case, prosecution is 
unlikely if the payment is made.169 Thus, the SFO Staff has also 
acknowledged the difficulty with an outright prohibition on facilitation 
payments. 
Incongruously, the Ministry of Justice has also conceded in the 
Guidance that eradicating facilitation payments will be no small feat: 
The [UK] Government does, however, recognise the 
problems that commercial organisations face in some parts 
of the world and in certain sectors. The eradication of 
facilitation payments is recognised at the national and 
166. /d. (emphasis added). 
167. Consider this quotation from 2500 years ago: "Just as it is impossible not to taste 
the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible 
for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish 
moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking 
water, so government servants employed in the government work cannot be found out 
(while) taking money for themselves." Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A 
Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320, 1320 (1997) (citing R.P. KANGLE, 
INTERPRETING KAUTILIY A, ARTHASASTRA, 4th Century B.C., (1979)). This is 
further illustrated in Bruce W. Bean, Hyperbole, Hypocrisy and Hubris in the Aid-
Corruption Dialog, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 781, 786 (2010). 
168. Dunn Article, supra note 108, at 2. 
169. /d. 
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international level is a long term objective that will require 
economic and social progress and sustained commitment to 
the rule of law in those parts of the world where the 
problem is most prevalent. 170 
101 
The Bribery Act makes it a crime to make facilitation payments even as the 
government makes clear that eliminating the need to make them cannot be 
accomplished, except, perhaps in the "long term." Why did Parliament take 
such a position? There are several possible contributing factors. Parliament 
was doubtless sensitive to the years of criticism from the OECD Working 
Group and from international NGOs like Transparency International. 
Domestic groups, such as the two that immediately challenged the 
termination of the SFO's investigation of BAE in December 2006, The 
Cornerhouse and the Campaign Against the Arms Trade,171 were also 
successful in generating media interest in the failure of Parliament to 
comply with the need for legislation called for by the OECD Convention. 
There was also the wish to restore the United Kindoms's reputation after 
the international media excoriated UK hypocrisy over the BAE scandal.172 
An additional factor was the contemporaneous "Rotten Parliament" scandal 
directly implicating almost 400 members of Parliament in inappropriate or 
fraudulent claims for reimbursement of allowances and expenses at 
precisely the moment Parliament was contemplating finally complying with 
the requirements of the OECD Convention.173 In its embarrassment over 
170. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 46. 
171. See supra text accompanying note 4 7; see e.g., News Release, CAA T and Comer 
House confident as appeal begins in Lords, CONTROLBAE.ORG .. uk (Jul. 6, 2008) available at 
http://www.controlbae.org.uk/press/release2008-07-06.php. 
172. A hint of this may be detected in the following statement from Jack Straw, Minister 
of Justice, which was included in the Foreword to the March 2009 draft Bribery Bill that had 
been reported on by the joint Committee in July 2009: 'The United Kingdom is recognised as 
one of the least conupt countries in the world. We are proud of the high ethical standards we uphold 
in public and commercial life. But we must not rest on our laurels. Bribery is by its very nature 
insidious; if it is not kept in check it can have potentially devastating consequences." (emphasis 
added). 
173. "Briefly, in 2009, London's Daily Telegraph ran a series of articles exposing a 
major breach of trust by more than half the Members of Parliament. Parliament fought to 
keep the information confidential but the Telegraph received leaked computer disks and 
published detailed expense filings of British members of Parliament. The British public was 
outraged to learn that they, the taxpayers, were, in effect, funding as reimbursable 
Parliamentary expenses everything from gardening and tennis court repairs to flat-screen 
TVs and even pornographic videos .... " Paul Hechinger, Infamous British Political 
Scandals: Expenses and the "Rotten Parliament," BBC AMERICA (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bbcamericacornlanglophenia/2012/0l/infamous-british-political-scandals-expenses-
and-the-%E2%80%98rotten-parliament%E2%80%99/ (Of the 392 Members of parliament 
implicated, some had used public funds to pay mortgages on their relatives' homes. The 
disclosures resulted in lengthy investigations, many resignations, the implementation of new 
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both the BAE and Rotten Parliament scandals, Parliament enacted an 
unusually draconian Bribery Act. 
What is a non-UK company expected to do to comply with the Act? If 
the choices are either knowingly violate the Bribery Act or stop doing 
business "in those parts of the world" where bribery is common, these are 
not wonderful alternatives. It will be more likely that a non-UK business 
simply avoid all contact with London and the United Kingdom, a surely 
unintended consequence of Parliament's much delayed enactment of the 
Bribery Act. The dilemma facing non-UK companies involved in 
international business is stark, as illustrated by an example from the United 
States. A Board of Directors has a clear obligation under Delaware law to 
establish procedures designed to insure that its company does not violate 
"positive law."174 It is plainly illegal under the Bribery Act to make 
facilitation payments, except in "emergencies," such as threats involving 
"loss of life, limb or liberty," where prosecution is unlikely. 175 But if the 
price were $1000, is prosecution still "unlikely?" Is "unlikely" comfort 
enough for the Board? And what policy should a Board of Directors of a 
company that perhaps does some small "part" of its business in the UK 
establish given the clear direction from Delaware courts that the Board's 
fiduciary obligation is to make certain company employees do not 
intentionally violate the law? 
It is clear that the so-called "continued outlawing" of facilitation 
payments under the Bribery Act is one of the most problematic aspects of 
the law. Given the extreme position the SFO has taken with respect to the 
jurisdictional reach of the Act, purporting to ensnare all organizations that 
have some connection with the United Kingdom, one can perhaps be 
forgiven for suggesting that Parliament, knowing that US-based companies 
are permitted to make facilitation payments and observing that the 
expense rules and accounting, and enormous embarrassment. The scandal of the "Rotten 
Parliament," as it came to be called, also resulted in criminal charges, convictions, and 
prison sentences. /d.). See also British Parliament Expense Abuses, NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 5, 
201 0), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizationslb/british_parliament/ 
expense_ abuses/index.html. 
174. The Delaware Supreme Court established the test for "director oversight," which 
contemplates that a director must act in good faith in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation, by adopting the test set forth in the lower court opinion. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) 
("The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care and 
loyalty ... but all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders. A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best 
interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable 
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties." /d. at 67 (emphasis added).). 
175. "It is recognised that there are circumstances in which individuals are left with no 
alternative but to make payments in order to protect against loss of life, limb or liberty. The 
common law defence of duress is very likely to be available in such circumstances." 
GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 48. 
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overwhelming majority of multinational enterprises investigated and fined 
by US officials under the FCPA in recent years have been non-US firms 
deliberately targeted relevant commercial organizations established in the 
United States.176 Such targeting perhaps satisfied a goal of some involved in 
preparing the Bribery Act of reestablishing the United Kingdom as a global 
leader in fighting corruption, following the embarrassment of the BAE and 
Rotten Parliament scandals. 177 
3. Hospitality Payments 
In addition to the intractable problem posed by small facilitation 
payments for companies squarely within the scope of the Bribery Act, and 
perhaps those doing only very occasional business in the United Kingdom, 
the Bribery Act presents further issues for business entertainment costs, 
known in the Act as "hospitality payments." With regard to these payments, 
the Ministry of Justice has explained: 
Bona fide hospitality and promotional, or other business 
expenditure which seeks to improve the image of a 
commercial organisation, better to present products . and 
services, or establish cordial relations, is recognised as an 
established and important part of doing business and it is 
not the intention of the Act to criminalise such 
behaviour. 178 
The Guidance states that for an entertainment expense to amount to a bribe, 
there must be "an intention for a financial or other advantage to influence 
the official in his or her official role and thereby secure business or a 
_ P_l1~ines~ aliv~nt~ge."179 Th~ Guidanc~_furtlJ.er re_s_tates _its fa_!11iliar _l"~frain: 
"In many cases, ... the question as to whether such a connection [between 
the advantage offered and the intention to secure a business advantage] can 
be established will depend on the totality of the evidence which takes into 
account all of the surrounding circumstances." 180 A determination based 
upon such a "totality of the evidence" can only be authoritatively made by a 
court. 
The examples offered in the Guidance demonstrate that whether a 
176. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected by a U.S. Law Barring Bribes, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-
settlements-under-us-law-are-mostly-with-foreign-countries.html? _r=2&ref=business. 
177. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, DRAFT BRIBERY 
BILL, 2008-9, H.C. 430-I & H.L. 115-I, ~ 88 (U.K.). 
178. GuiDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 26. 
179. GUIDANCE, supra note 65, ~ 27. 
180. !d.~ 28. 
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hospitality payment would be found to be illegal depends heavily on 
context. 181 The Guidance provides that while expenditure levels are not the 
only consideration in determining whether a Section 6 offense, bribery of a 
foreign public official, has been committed: 
[I]n the absence of any further evidence demonstrating the 
required connection, it is unlikely, for example, that 
incidental provision of a routine business courtesy will 
raise the inference that it was intended to have a direct 
impact on decision making, particularly where such 
hospitality is commensurate with the reasonable and 
proportionate norms for the particular industry; e.g. the 
provision of airport to hotel transfer services to facilitate an 
on-site visit, or dining and tickets to an event. 182 
However, the Guidance once again proves itself to be virtually useless to 
the many companies actually doing business while aware of their obligation 
to comply with the Bribery Act. Most companies operating internationally 
now have "compliance officers" whose sole function is to instruct their 
employers as to what conduct is permitted under the Act. Can a company 
compliance officer function effectively when her best option is to wait to 
see whether the SFO prosecutes hospitality? 
Indeed, the UK government spokesman at the time of Parliament's 
consideration of the Bribery Act acknowledged, in January 2010, the scope 
of the problem with criminalizing hospitality payments: 
We recognise that corporate hospitality is an accepted part 
of modern business practice and the Government is not 
seeking to penalize expenditure on corporate hospitality for 
legitimate commercial purposes. But lavish corporate 
hospitality can also be used as a bribe to secure advantages 
and the offences in the Bill must therefore be capable of 
penalising those who use it for such purposes .... Corporate 
hospitality would ... trigger the offence only where it was 
proved that the person offering the hospitality intended the 
recipient to be influenced to act improperly. 183 
One commentator nicely frames this gray area: "Fixing the appropriate 
borderline between generous hospitality . . . and the criminal giving and 
181. !d.~ 31. 
182. !d. ~ 30. 
183. Letter from Lord Tunnicliffe to Lord Henley of the House of Lords, (Jan. 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.UK/publications/docslletter-lord-henley-corporate-
hospitality.pdf. UK 
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taking of unconscionable, material· advantages on the other, is not easy to 
capture in language suitable for forensic use."184 The accuracy of this 
statement is plain. While conceding the difficulty of the distinction between 
"lavish" and "legitimate" forms of hospitality, Parliament, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the SFO could have done better. 
The FCPA includes an affirmative defense185 that is somewhat more 
descriptive: 
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under 
subsection (a) or (g) of this section that--
(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of 
value that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, 
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, 
party official, or candidate and was directly related to--
( A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation 
of products or services; or 
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with 
a foreign government or agency thereof. 186 
Thus, the FCPA has a somewhat more realistic and flexible approach to the 
crirninalization of hospitality payments than does the Bribery Act. 
However, Parliament did not have the foresight, or possibly the intent, to 
offer a similar defense for companies that are subject to the Bribery Act's 
provisions; instead, companies can rely only on the Guidance's admonition 
that each situation involving hospitality expenditures will be fact-specific. 
Surely the business community needs and deserves more from 
P(lrlia111ent' S_!l!<lP.Eat~~-~~gu!4a_nc_e" tlmn to merely_ ~ope _th<tt _ t~~ _ r~pu!_ation 
damage that an SFO investigation would engender and the huge expense of 
litigation would not be triggered each time a business lunch is recorded on 
its books. Unfortunately, this is one more example of the Bribery Act's 
unjust mandates, and only time will tell how such cases will actually be 
prosecuted it is not likely that many companies will remain unscathed for 
what are most likely legitimate business expenditures. In keeping with this 
theme, in the next section we discuss the lack of due process inherent in the 
184. G. R. Sullivan, Reforming Bribery: Law Commission Consultation Paper 185- (2), 
Reforming the Law of Bribery (LCCP No. 185): Bribery Outside England and Wales: 
Corporate Liability; Defences; Consent to Prosecution, Crim. L, Rev. 687-701 (2008). 
185. A second affirmative defense, but one of no real practical use, is to establish that 
"the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawfol under 
the written laws and regulations of the foreign official's, political party's, party official's, or 
candidate's country." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(l) (2012). 
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l (c). 
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Act's criminalizing failure to prevent bribery. 
B. Comment on Strict Liability, Due Process, and ECHR Article 6(2) 
The total absence of due process in the Section 7 strict liability crime 
is clear. 
When in 2008 the Law Commission was directed for the second time 
in ten years to review existing laws on bribery, the Commission was 
specifically requested to draft a bill which would include provisions that 
"are fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998." 187 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention provides that "[ e ]veryone 
charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law."188 Article 6 of the UK Human Rights Act, entitled 
Right to a Fair Trial, similarly provides: "[i]f it is a criminal charge you are 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law and have certain 
guaranteed rights to defend yourself."189 The strict liability for a 
commercial organization under Section 7 of the Bribery Act contravenes 
these mandates. 
Taking heed of its mandate to prepare a draft that complied with the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act and having taken specific advice from 
UK legal experts on this point, the Law Commission's draft bill included a 
failure to prevent bribery provision, but one which did not violate Article 
6(2). 190 This provision differed in two major respects from the provision in 
the final Bribery Act. The corporate failure to prevent bribery offense was 
limited to businesses organized in England or Wales and thus was well 
within traditional notions of territorial jurisdiction. Second, the bribe 
triggering the charge of failing to prevent a bribe had to result from 
negligence of a person responsible for preventing such bribe.191 Six months 
later, in March 2009, the Ministry of Justice, having reviewed the Law 
Commission's report, submitted its draft bill to Parliament. 192 The Ministry 
of Justice draft retained the negligence element193 but extended the law's 
jurisdictional grasp by not limiting its jurisdiction to businesses organized 
in England and Wales. Rather, the draft submitted to Parliamentary review 
187. See LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 45, at p. 14. 
188. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Art. 6(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 3213 
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.htm1#Convention. 
189. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sch. 1 available at http://www.legis1ation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/1998/4 2/schedule/ 1/partll/chapter/5/data. pdf. 
190. LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 44, at pp. 164-65. 
191. !d. at 164. 
192. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRJBERY ACT DRAFT LEGISLATION, 2009, Cm. 7570, at p. 1 
(U.K.) available at http://www.officia1-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7570/7570.pdf. 
193. !d.§ 5(l)(c). 
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made the offense applicable to any business "which carries on a business, or 
part of a business, in England, Wales or Northern Ireland."194 
During Parliament's consideration of the government draft, certain 
non-governmental organizations and individuals proposed to eliminate the 
negligence element, arguing that this provision offered only a "narrow and 
complex solution to a pressing problem."195 Professor Jeremy Horder, the 
Law Commission's expert on criminal law, disagreed. As stated in the 
Report of the Joint Committee that reviewed the government's draft law: 
Professor Horder acknowledged the greater simplicity 
of dropping negligence as an element of the offence, but he 
did not believe that it would be fair to convict a company 
for the criminal act of its employee or agent without 
requiring the prosecution to prove that the company was 
itself at fault. He distinguished bribery as a "step up" in 
seriousness from any existing strict liability offence under 
health and safety or other legislation: 
[It] is very different from attributing causal 
consequences, like earwigs in tins or deaths occurring 
on ships or wherever it may be, to a company . . . . You 
can only fairly, in my view, connect a deliberate act of 
bribery by an employee or agent to a company via the 
company's own fault, ifl could put it that way, or here 
we have got it as 'a responsible person or number of 
persons'. 196 
The directors of both the SFO and the Crown Prosecution Service 
testified before Parliament's Joint Committee and agreed with Professor 
Horder as to the unfairness of eliminating the negligence element from the 
Section 7 crime. 197 Parliament ignored the opinions of the Law 
Commission's expert, Professor Horder, and legal conclusions of those 
responsible for enforcing UK law and eliminated the negligence element 
from the Section crime of failing to prevent bribery. Parliament attempted 
to justify its approach by citing the "everyone else is doing it" defense, 
finding that strict liability would not be unfair "given the parallel with the 
approach taken in other leading countries."198 The Joint Committee did 
194. !d. § 5(7). 
195. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, DRAFT BRIBERY 
BILL, 2008-9, H.C. 430-1 & H.L. 115-1, ~ 76 (U.K.), citing BRIBERY: CORPORATE 
LIABILITY UNDER THE DRAFT BILL 2009, CRIM. L. REV. 479 (2009). 
196. !d.~ 83. 
197. !d. 
198. !d. ~ 9. The other leading countries to which Parliament referred were the United 
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receive testimony on enforcement of anti-bribery laws in other jurisdictions, 
but no consideration was given to the unique provision in the bill applying 
it to businesses not organized in the United Kingdom. This strict liability 
offense will surely be tested in court as a violation of the ECHR's 
requirement of the presumption of innocence standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have summarized the extended history that led to the 
enactment of the UK Bribery Act 2010, the UK legislation required to 
comply with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. After signing the 
OECD Convention, the British government took the position that its 
existing domestic anti-bribery legislation satisfied this requirement. 
However, others disagreed, and the OECD Working Group established to 
monitor compliance consistently found UK compliance to be lacking. The 
UK government set about reforming its existing corruption legislation, 
based on the recommendation of the Nolan Report and the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Standards in Public Life that reform was necessary. 
However, the "reform" process consisted of more than a decade of 
debating, consulting, and infighting as various government bodies dragged 
their feet on agreeing on a final version of a new corruption law, 
specifically targeting bribery. When the Bribery Act was finally enacted, 
more than thirty years after the FCPA went into effect, the result, as we 
have shown, was, in a word, disappointing, despite Parliament's apparent 
goal of ending bribery in the United Kingdom and everywhere. 
The offenses of active and passive bribery cover a wide spectrum of 
conduct and would benefit from more clear-cut, definitive guidance from 
the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, various terms in the Bribery Act 
emphasize the overly broad jurisdictional reach of the Act, which will 
surely have unintended consequences for companies abroad. For example, 
as we have discussed regarding "relevant function or activity," the acting 
party is guilty even where the relevant function or activity is carried out 
abroad. The activity need not have any connection to the United Kingdom, 
and the measure of what is "improper" is determined by UK standards, not 
by those of the foreign country where the bribing occurs. Furthermore, a 
relevant function or activity is performed improperly if it is performed in 
breach of a relevant expectation, or the failure to perform is a breach of a 
relevant expectation. However, the breach of a relevant expectation follows 
a reasonableness test, based only on what is considered "reasonable" in the 
United Kingdom. Likewise, an offense under Section 6, pertaining to 
bribery of a foreign public official, has no jurisdictional limit: a foreign 
public official includes anyone, whether elected or appointed, who holds a 
States, Australia, Switzerland, Finland, Italy and Austria. 
2013] UNSCREWING THE INSCRUTABLE 109 
legislative, administrative, or judicial position of any kind of a country or 
territory outside the United Kingdom. 
Most importantly, we have shown in particular that the strict liability 
corporate offense of failure to prevent bribery is an unprecedented attempt 
to govern international business transactions with only the vaguest 
connection to the United Kingdom. The Act also broadens the definition of 
"bribe" to include the types of small facilitation payments regularly found 
to be essential when traveling or operating in some developing nations. 
Furthermore, Parliament has permitted only a single defense to its strict 
crime of failing to prevent a bribe. Perhaps recognizing the absurd nature of 
the "adequate procedures" defense, Parliament demanded that the 
government publish guidance explaining how a business could comply with 
the "Alice in Wonderland" defense of proving its procedures were adequate 
despite their failure. Clearly, the Ministry of Justice's Guidance fails to 
provide meaningful guidance on this crucial question. Finally, we noted that 
in enacting Section 7, Parliament ignored the due process standard 
established by the ECHR and the United Kingdom's own Human Rights 
Act. 
The Bribery Act 2010 is the disappointing result of years of delay and 
deliberation on the part of both the government and Parliament. The 
hardships that companies now face in attempting to comply with the Act are 
just beginning. The contours of the Bribery Act will be fully known only as 
the judiciary construes this law. The unintended consequences of 
Parliament's apparent need to enact what can only be called a truly 
draconian anti-bribery law in order to overcome the embarrassment of the 
government's role in the BAE scandal, the oft-criticized dozen years of 
procrastination before the Bribery Act was passed, and its own Allowances 
and Expenses scandal will be forthcoming for years. 

